















and Folk Theorems: Two Examples
Andrea Attar∗ Eloisa Campioni†
Thomas Mariotti‡ Gwenae¨l Piaser§
May 30, 2019
Abstract
We study competing-mechanism games under exclusive competition: principals
first simultaneously post mechanisms, after which agents simultaneously choose to
participate and communicate with at most one principal. In this setting, which is
common to competing-auction and competitive-search applications, we develop two
complete-information examples that question the relevance of the folk theorems for
competing-mechanism games documented in the literature. The first example shows
that there can exist pure-strategy equilibria in which some principal obtains a payoff
below her min-max payoff, computed over all principals’ decisions. Thus folk-theorem-
like results may have to involve a bound on principals’ payoffs that depends on the
spaces of messages available to the agents, and not only on the players’ actions. The
second example shows that even this nonintrinsic approach is misleading when agents’
participation decisions are strategic: there can exist incentive-feasible allocations in
which principals obtain payoffs above their min-max payoffs, computed over arbitrary
spaces of mechanisms, but which cannot be supported in equilibrium.
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1 Introduction
Competition in financial, labor, and monetary markets is often modeled by assuming that
sellers noncooperatively design trade mechanisms. Final allocations are then determined
by buyers’ strategic participation and communication decisions in these mechanisms. In
competing auctions (McAfee (1993), Peters (1997), Peters and Severinov (1997), Virag
(2010)), privately informed buyers observe the posted mechanisms, choose the auction they
want to participate to, and then bid according to their valuations. In competitive search
(Moen (1997), Eeckhout and Kircher (2010), Wright, Kircher, Julien and Guerrieri (2017),
Auster and Gottardi (2019)), buyers apply to their preferred trade mechanism, meet a seller
according to some meeting technology, and, once in a meeting, communicate with the seller
they are matched with, possibly revealing private information to her.
These interactions are instances of competing-mechanism games in which principals
first simultaneously commit to mechanisms and agents then simultaneously participate and
communicate with principals. Mechanisms are public and are not contingent on one another.
That is, when designing a mechanism, a principal cannot directly condition her decisions
on the market information generated by her competitors’ mechanisms, and held by the
agents. However, she can, in principle, indirectly condition her decisions on reports by
the agents about their market information. Since the seminal work of Epstein and Peters
(1999), the literature on competing mechanisms has emphasized that providing agents with
the opportunity to report both their exogenous private information and their endogenous
market information can spectacularly enlarge the set of equilibrium allocations. Following
Yamashita (2010), several contributions (Peters and Troncoso-Valverde (2013), Xiong (2013),
Ghosh and Han (2018)) have indeed offered different versions of a folk theorem: in a nutshell,
letting principals’ mechanisms be sufficiently reactive to agents’ reports about their market
information allows one to support in equilibrium any incentive-compatible allocation that
yields each principal a payoff above a well-specified min-max bound. These results are
established under fairly general conditions on the primitives of the game, which questions
the relevance of the equilibrium analyses provided in the applied literature.
The present paper further elaborates on this issue. We focus on situations in which
agents’ participation decisions are strategic, in line with the intended economic applications
of the competing-mechanism paradigm, and we provide two examples that fundamentally
challenge the logic of folk theorems in this context.
As a contrast to our results, it is useful to review the arguments leading to folk theorems
for competing-mechanism games, as first developed by Yamashita (2010). Let each principal
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commit to decisions to punish a unilateral deviation by any of her competitors, when reported
by a majority of agents through appropriate messages, and assume that the agents’ message
sets are rich enough to allow them to select a specific punishment for each of these deviations.
Then, if there are at least three agents, any such punishment can be selected by majority
voting in the message game played by the agents. When unilaterally deviating, each principal
hence anticipates that her competitors will react by min-maximizing her: as a result, any
incentive-compatible allocation yielding her a payoff above the corresponding bound can be
supported in equilibrium by such mechanisms. The lower bound of a principal’s equilibrium
payoffs turns out to coincide with her min-max payoff computed over all mechanisms available
to principals, which establishes the folk theorem. This equality, however, obtains by making
agents able to select the worst punishment against every principal in every subgame, which
effectively requires that each agent participates and communicates with each principal for
any profile of posted mechanisms. We find this assumption hard to justify in the light of
economic applications, in which agents’ communication decisions are closely tied to their
participation decisions. That is, an agent can communicate the information he possesses to
a given principal only if he chooses to participate with her.
We show that taking into account agents’ participation decisions in competing-mechanism
games has dramatic implications for the possibility of deriving folk-theorem results. We
focus on the situation in which agents participate and communicate with at most one
principal, as is assumed both in competitive-auction and in competitive-search models. In
this exclusive-competition scenario, we construct two examples for the complete-information
case in which agents’ types are degenerate, so that they can only take participation decisions
and can only report about their market information.
Our first example exhibits equilibria of competing-mechanism games in which some
principal obtains a payoff below her min-max payoff, computed over the set of principals’
decisions. In this example, the explicit consideration of agents’ participation decisions leads
to discontinuities and nonconvexities that prevent from applying the standard min-max logic,
despite the fact that there are only two principals who are allowed to randomize over their
decisions. The min-max payoff of the principal in question is strictly higher than her max-min
payoff, and hence cannot be a relevant bound for equilibrium characterization. The result
suggests that to establish a folk theorem in complete-information games, one may need to
specify a nonintrinsic bound that depends on the agents’ message sets, which in turn limits
the predictive power of the approach.
Our second example establishes that even this approach is unsatisfactory when agents’
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participation decisions are strategic. In this example, the min-max payoff for each principal
can be straightforwardly computed over arbitrary mechanisms, and it coincides with the
corresponding max-min payoff. Yet, the fact that each agent can communicate with at
most one principal makes it impossible to construct sophisticated equilibrium threats. As
a consequence, although there exist many incentive-feasible allocations in which principals
obtain payoffs above their min-max payoffs, none of them can be supported in equilibrium.
Each principal’s equilibrium payoff thus coincides with its min-max payoff, even if the
analysis is extended so as to allow for mixed-strategy equilibria.
Related Literature
This note is closely related to the recent literature on folk theorems in competing-mechanism
games initiated by Yamashita (2010). The main contribution of Yamashita (2010) is to
highlight the role of recommendation mechanisms. By offering such a mechanism, a principal
commits to a direct mechanism if all but one agent recommend her to do so. Letting
principals post recommendation mechanisms makes it possible to reproduce the equilibrium
allocations associated to the universal space of mechanisms identified by Epstein and Peters
(1999). Yamashita (2010) further assumes that each agent participates and communicates
with all principals for any profile of mechanisms, which allows him to rely on recommendation
mechanisms to derive an equilibrium characterization in terms of principals’ min-max payoffs.
His analysis has been extended in two important directions.
First, the bound for principals’ equilibrium payoffs proposed by Yamashita (2010) is
sensitive to the mechanisms available in the game. This makes it difficult to evaluate
his contribution in the light of standard folk theorems. The recent work of Peters and
Troncoso-Valverde (2013) provides an abstract framework for incomplete-information games
and formulates the corresponding bounds through agents’ incentive constraints in the spirit
of Myerson (1979). The bounds are therefore defined in terms of the primitives of the
model and, in contrast to Yamashita (2010), do not depend on the set of available (indirect)
mechanisms. Ghosh and Han (2018) extend Yamashita (2010) to repeated interactions and
reformulate the bounds on principals’ equilibrium payoffs in these settings.
Yet, neither Peters and Troncoso-Valverde (2013) nor Ghosh and Han (2018) allow players
to take any action after mechanisms are posted. Our first example shows that, under
complete information, the bounds identified by Peters and Troncoso-Valverde (2013) and
Ghosh and Han (2018) are no longer relevant for principals’ equilibrium payoffs if agents’
participation decisions are taken into account.
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Second, Yamashita (2010) restricts principals to deterministic mechanisms and only
considers pure-strategy equilibria of the agents’ game. Szentes (2009) shows that this
restriction is critical by constructing a simple complete-information game in which the
equilibrium allocations supported by deterministic mechanisms yield a principal a payoff
below Yamashita’s (2010) min-max bound. Xiong (2013) provides a generalized version
of Yamashita (2010), in which random mechanisms are allowed and a folk theorem is
established. Crucially, he also assumes that agents always communicate with all principals.
We share with Szentes (2009) the focus on complete information, but we allow principals
to post random mechanisms, and we do not restrict agents to play pure strategies. In
contrast with these approaches, we explicitly model agents’ participation decisions. Our
second example then shows that recommendation mechanisms may not guarantee a system
of punishments allowing each principal to min-maximize his opponents.
An alternative route to folk theorems in competing mechanism games is based on the
notion of contractible contracts. Following Tennenholz (2004) and Kalai, Kalai, Lehrer, and
Samet (2010), Peters and Szentes (2012), Peters (2015) and Szentes (2015) let principals
design mechanisms that depend on the mechanisms of their opponents. This allows them
to directly punish a deviator in a way that depends on the specific deviation she chooses,
which can yield a folk theorem even in the absence of a strategic role for the agents. The
observability requirements underlying this approach, however, are too demanding in the light
of the economic applications we consider.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces a general model of exclusive
competition under complete information. Sections 3 and 4 present our examples. Section 5
concludes. Proofs not given in the text can be found in the Appendix.
2 The Model
We consider a setting in which several principals, indexed by j ∈ J ≡ {1, . . . , J}, contract
with several agents, indexed by i ∈ I ≡ {1, . . . , I}. Agents have no private information, and
we denote each agent’s single type by t.
Actions and Payoffs Agents only take participation decisions, and we denote by aij ∈ Aij ≡
{Y,N} agent i’s decision to participate (Y ) or not (N) with principal j. Such decisions are
exclusive, in that each agent i can participate with at most one principal j. Hence, overall,
each agent i takes an action ai in the set Ai ≡ {(ai1, . . . , aiJ) : aij = Y for at most one j}.
Each principal j in turn takes an action xj in a finite set Xj. We let vj : A ×X → R and
4
ui : A × X → R be the payoff functions of principal j and of agent i, respectively, where
A ≡ A1 × . . .× AI and X ≡ X1 × . . .×XJ .
Communication Communication takes place through the public mechanisms posted by
the principals and the messages sent by the agents in these mechanisms. Formally, agent i
sends a private message mij to principal j in some Polish space M
i
j .
1 Each message space
M ij includes the empty message ∅, which corresponds to agent i not communicating with
principal j, as well as the trivial message t. Communication is tied to participation, in the
sense that agent i sends a nonempty message to principal j if and only if he decides to
participate with her. Hence, overall, each agent i sends messages mi in the space M i ≡
{(mi1, . . . ,miJ) : mij 6= ∅ for at most one j}, and we say that a profile (mi, ai) ∈ M i × Ai is
consistent for agent i whenever mij 6= ∅ if and only if aij = Y for all j. We denote by Ci the
space of such consistent communication and participation profiles for agent i.
Mechanisms Each principal j can take an action contingent on the messages mj ∈ Mj
she receives and the agents’ decisions aj ∈ Aj to participate with her, where by definition
Mj ≡ M1j × . . . ×M Ij and Aj ≡ A1j × . . . × AIj . We say that a profile (mj, aj) ∈ Mj × Aj
is consistent for principal j if mij 6= ∅ if and only if aij = Y for all i. We denote by
Cj the space of such consistent communication and participation profiles for principal j.
Notice that, because Mj is Polish and Aj is finite, Cj is Polish. A mechanism for principal
j is a Borel-measurable mapping γj : Cj → ∆(Xj) that associates to every consistent
communication and participation profile for principal j a lottery over her actions.
Admissibility Whereas most of our analysis focuses on situations in which principals play
pure strategies in equilibrium, a general requirement for defining expected payoffs in our and
related games is that the evaluation mapping (γj, cj) 7→ γj(cj) describing how the distribution
of principal j’s action varies with her mechanism and the consistent communication and
participation profile she observes be measurable. Thus, at a minimum, we must define a
measurable structure on the set Γ
Mj
j of mechanisms for principal j. Two cases can arise.
If Mj and, hence, Cj, is countable, we can take Γ
Mj
j to be the set of all Borel-measurable
mappings γj : Cj → ∆(Xj); a natural measurable structure on ΓMjj is then the product
Borel σ-field on the product of at most countably infinitely many copies of ∆(Xj). If Mj is
uncountable, however, there is no measurable structure on the set of all Borel-measurable
mappings γj : Cj → ∆(Xj) such that the evaluation mapping for principal j is measurable
1Our first example only allows for minimal communication, and thus finite message sets. Our second
example, by contrast, allows for rich communication, and thus uncountable message spaces. Requiring these
spaces to be Polish entails no loss of generality.
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(Aumann (1961)); in that case, there is no other choice than to restrict the set of admissible
mechanisms Γ
Mj
j . Admissibility can be shown to coincide with the requirement that Γ
Mj
j be of
bounded Borel class (Aumann (1961), Rao (1971)), allowing for a rich class of mechanisms
for our analysis. With this caveat in mind, we hereafter fix an admissible space Γ
Mj
j of
mechanisms for every principal j, with associated σ-field GMjj .
Strategies and Timing The competing-mechanism game GM induced by M unfolds in
three stages:
1. The principals simultaneously post mechanisms.
2. The agents simultaneously take consistent communication and participation decisions.
3. The principals’ mechanisms are implemented, lotteries realize, and all payoffs accrue.
A strategy for principal j is a probability measure µj ∈ ∆(ΓMjj ) over the σ-field GMjj . A
strategy for agent i is a measurable mapping λi : ΓM → ∆(Ci) that associates to every
profile of mechanisms a probability measure over consistent communication and participation
profiles for agent i, where ΓM ≡ ΓM11 × . . .× ΓMJJ for M ≡ M1 × . . .×MJ is endowed with
the product σ-field GM11 ⊗ . . . ⊗ GMJJ and ∆(Ci) with the Borel σ-field. The allocation
z(γ, λ) induced by the mechanisms γ ≡ (γ1, . . . , γJ) and the strategies λ ≡ (λ1, . . . , λI)
is the probability measure over outcomes in A × X uniquely defined by the marginal of
λ1(γ)⊗ . . .⊗ λI(γ) over A and the probability transitions γj from Cj to Xj. Notice that the
mapping z(·, λ) : ΓM → ∆(A × X) : γ 7→ z(γ, λ) is measurable. Hence we can define the
allocation z(µ, λ) induced by the strategies µ ≡ (µ1, . . . , µJ) and λ ≡ (λ1, . . . , λI) by
z(µ, λ)(a, x) ≡
∫
ΓM
z(γ, λ)(a, x)µ1(dγ1)⊗ . . .⊗ µJ(dγJ)
for all (a, x) ∈ A×X.
Equilibrium The strategy profile (µ, λ) is a subgame-perfect equilibrium (SPNE) of GM
whenever:
(i) For each γ ∈ ΓM , (λ1(γ), . . . , λI(γ)) is a Nash equilibrium in the subgame γ played by
the agents.
(ii) Given the continuation equilibrium λ, µ is a Nash equilibrium of the game played by
the principals.
We denote by Λ∗(γ) the set of Nash equilibria of the subgame γ. Following Epstein and Peters
(1999) and Han (2007), we will mostly focus on SPNEs of GM in which principals play pure
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strategies (SPNE-PSP). That is, each principal deterministically posts a mechanism; notice,
however, that this mechanism may involve randomization over her final actions.
Direct Mechanisms In our complete-information setting, a direct mechanism for principal
j is a mechanism such that the message space Mj is restricted to the trivial message t and
the empty message ∅. Because in this case communication decisions are redundant relative
to participation decisions, such a mechanism can be identified to a mapping γ˜j : Aj → ∆(Xj)
that associates to every participation profile for principal j a lottery over her actions. We
denote by Γ˜j the set of direct mechanisms for principal j, and we let Γ˜ ≡ Γ˜1× . . .× Γ˜J and G˜
be the competing-mechanism game in which principals are restricted to direct mechanisms.
Notice that, because Aj and Xj are finite, Γ˜j is a compact and convex subset of a Euclidean
space. A strategy for agent i in G˜ can be identified to a Borel-measurable mapping λ˜i :
Γ˜→ ∆(Ai) that associates to every profile of direct mechanisms a lottery over participation
profiles for agent i. We say that the allocation z(γ˜, λ˜) is incentive-feasible if λ˜ ∈ Λ∗(γ˜).
3 The First Example
Let I = J ≡ 2 and let X1 ≡ {x11, x12} and X2 ≡ {x21, x22} be the sets of actions of principal
1 (P1) and principal 2 (P2), respectively. Let A1 = A2 ≡ {Y N,NY,NN} be agent 1’s (A1)
and agent 2’s (A2) sets of actions, where Y N , for instance, refers to the agent participating
with P1 but not with P2. Payoffs are represented in the matrix in Table 1 below, in which
agents choose in the external box and principals choose in the internal 2 × 2 cells. Each
array represents the payoffs to P1, P2, A1, and A2, respectively.
Y N NY
x21 x22 x21 x22
Y N x11 (0, ζ, 5,
25
2
) (0, ζ, 5, 25
2
) x11 (0, 0, 5, 12) (0, 10, 5, 8)
x12 (0, ζ, 10,
9
2
) (0, ζ, 10, 9
2
) x12 (0, 0, 10, 12) (0, 10, 10, 8)
x21 x22 x21 x22
NY x11 (0, 10, 8, 12) (0, 8, 9, 12) x11 (0, ζ, 40, 7) (0, ζ, 4, 13)
x12 (0, 10, 8, 8) (0, 8, 9, 8) x12 (0, ζ, 40, 7) (0, ζ, 4, 13)
Table 1: The payoff matrix.
Observe that P1’s payoff is constantly equal to 0, and that, for any profile of participation
decisions by the agents, P1’s choice of action has no impact on P2’s payoff. Hence there are no
direct payoff externalities between the principals, and P1 can affect P2’s payoff only insofar as
she can influence the agents’ participation decisions through her choice of a mechanism. We
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assume, in addition, that the no-participation decision NN is strictly dominated for every
agent, and we let ζ < 0 be an arbitrarily large loss for P2 if neither A1 nor A2 participate
with her, or if both A1 and A2 participate with her. Notice also that there exists at least one
incentive-feasible allocation yielding P2 her maximal payoff of 10. To see this, consider the
simple direct mechanisms in which P1 chooses x11 and P2 chooses x21 for any participation
decisions of the agents. The resulting subgame played by the agents only admits the Nash
equilibrium (NY, Y N), which yields P2 a payoff of 10.
3.1 The Game G˜
We first consider the game G˜ in which each principal does not ask for private messages
and associates to every profile of agents’ decisions to participate with her a lottery over her
actions. Let us first observe that a direct mechanism for P1, say γ˜1, is represented by the
following list of participation-contingent probability distributions over X1:
γ˜1(Y, Y ) = (δY,Y , 1− δY,Y ), γ˜1(Y,N) = (δY,N , 1− δY,N),
γ˜1(N, Y ) = (δN,Y , 1− δN,Y ), γ˜1(N,N) = (δN,N , 1− δN,N),
where δa11,a21 denotes the probability of P1 choosing action x11 given a participation profile
(a11, a
2
1) ∈ A1 for P1. Thus, for instance, δY,N is the probability that P1 chooses x11 if only A1
chooses to participate with her. Similarly, a direct mechanism for P2, say γ˜2, is represented
by participation-contingent probability distributions over X2, and we let σa12,a22 denote the




2) ∈ A2 for P2. Our first
result is that the principals’ payoffs are uniquely pinned down in any SPNE-PSP of G˜.
Proposition 1 The principals obtain payoffs (0, 10) in any SPNE-PSP of G˜.
Proof. Recall that P1’s payoff is constantly equal to 0. We thus only need to show that
for every direct mechanism posted by P1, that is, for every family of transition probabilities
δa11,a21 , there exists a direct mechanism for P2, that is, a family of transition probabilities
σa12,a22 , inducing a unique Nash equilibrium in the subgame played by the agents, in which
P2 achieves her maximal payoff of 10.
Case 1 Suppose first that δY,Y >
2
5
. In this case, let P2 post a mechanism such that




, we have 10 − 5δY,Y < 8. Thus NY is a strictly dominant strategy
for A1 in this subgame, which guarantees that (NY, Y N) is the unique Nash equilibrium.
Because σY,N = 1, P2 obtains a payoff of 10.
8
Y N NY
Y N (10− 5δY,Y , 92 + 8δY,Y ) (10− 5δY,N , 12)
NY (8, 8 + 4δN,Y ) (40, 7)
Table 2: The subgame of G˜ induced by δY,Y >
2
5
and σY,Y = σY,N = σN,Y = 1.
Case 2 Suppose next that δY,Y ≤ 25 . In this case, let P2 post a mechanism such that
σY,Y = σN,Y = σY,N = 0, which induces the subgame in Table 3.
Y N NY
Y N (10− 5δY,Y , 92 + 8δY,Y ) (10− 5δY,N , 8)
NY (9, 8 + 4δN,Y ) (4, 13)
Table 3: The subgame of G˜ induced by δY,Y ≤ 25 and σY,Y = σY,N = σN,Y = 0.
Because δY,Y ≤ 25 , we have 92 + 8δY,Y < 8. Thus NY is a strictly dominant strategy for
A2 in this subgame, which, as 10−5δY,N ≥ 4, guarantees that (Y N,NY ) is the unique Nash
equilibrium. Because σN,Y = 0, P2 obtains a payoff of 10. Hence the result. 
The proof of Proposition 1 actually shows the stronger result that, given any direct
mechanism γ˜1 posted by P1, P2 can defend his maximal payoff of 10 by posting a direct
mechanism γ˜2 that induces a unique Nash equilibrium in the subgame γ˜ ≡ (γ˜1, γ˜2). That is,
the following min-max-min payoff for P2:







is equal to 10 in the game G˜. Notice that the definition of V 2 only allows principals to offer
direct mechanisms; as such, it is specified only in terms of the primitives of the model, that is,
the actions available to the players and the resulting payoffs. In this respect, it is analogous
to the min-max bounds introduced by Peters and Troncoso-Valverde (2013), Peters (2014),
and Ghosh and Han (2018) in competing-mechanism games with complete information,
the only difference being that agents can take real participation decisions. Conversely, V 2
differs from the min-max-min bound introduced by Yamashita (2010), in which the set of
admissible mechanisms for each principal includes a recommendation mechanism, that is,
a specific indirect mechanism committing her to asking agents to recommend her a direct
mechanism and to following the majority recommendation.
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3.2 Indirect Mechanisms with Minimal Private Communication
In the game G˜, private communication between the agents and the principals can only take
place through the trivial message t, which an agent sends to a principal if he decides to
participate with her, and the empty message ∅, which she sends to her otherwise. Such
messages are redundant relative to participation decisions and, hence, essentially trivial. We
now consider a game GM in which a minimal degree of meaningful private communication
is allowed for. Specifically, we allow A1 to send one additional message m to P1. That is,
M11 ≡ {t,m, ∅}, while M21 = M12 = M22 ≡ {t, ∅} as in the game G˜.
In the game GM , P2 can only offer direct mechanisms γ˜2 described as above by transition
probabilities σa12,a22 . By contrast, P1 can also offer indirect mechanisms γ1 contingent on
the message m sent by A1, allowing her to generate additional threats. Extending our
previous notation, such a mechanism is represented by the following list of message- and
participation-contingent probability distributions over X1:
2
γ1((t, Y ), Y ) = (δ(t,Y ),Y , 1− δ(t,Y ),Y ), γ1((t, Y ), N) = (δ(t,Y ),N , 1− δ(t,Y ),N),
γ1((m,Y ), Y ) = (δ(m,Y ),Y , 1− δ(m,Y ),Y ), γ1((m,Y ), N) = (δ(m,Y ),N , 1− δ(m,Y ),N),
γ1(N, Y ) = (δN,Y , 1− δN,Y ), γ1(N,N) = (δN,N , 1− δN,N).
The subgame (γ1, γ˜2) is represented in Table 4 below.
Y N NY
(t, Y )N (10− 5δ(t,Y ),Y , 92 + 8δ(t,Y ),Y ) (10− 5δ(t,Y ),N , 8 + 4σN,Y )
(m,Y )N (10− 5δ(m,Y ),Y , 92 + 8δ(m,Y ),Y ) (10− 5δ(m,Y ),N , 8 + 4σN,Y )
NY (9− σY,N , 8 + 4δN,Y ) (4 + 36σY,Y , 13− 6σY,Y )
Table 4: The subgame (γ1, γ˜2) of G
M .
The following result shows that this minimal enlargement of a single agent’s message
space compared to the game G˜ has a dramatic impact on P2’s SPNE-PSP payoff set.
Proposition 2 If the loss ζ incurred by P1 when both A1 and A2 participate with her is
large enough, the principals can obtain any payoffs in {(0, pi) : pi ∈ [0, 10]} in an SPNE-PSP
of GM .
Proof. For the sake of clarity, all equilibrium objects will be indexed by a ∗. We prove
that, for each σ∗ ∈ [0, 1], there exists an SPNE-PSP of GM in which P1 posts a mechanism
γ∗1 and P2 posts a direct mechanism γ˜
∗
2 such that σ
∗
N,Y = σ
∗ and, on the equilibrium path,
2To alleviate the notation, and when no confusion can arise, we hereafter only indicate the nonempty
messages t and m sent by A1 to P1.
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A1 participates with P1 and A2 participates with P2 with probability 1, which yields P2 a
payoff 10(1− σ∗).
Thus fix some σ∗ ∈ [0, 1]. To construct an SPNE-PSP in which P2 posts a direct
mechanism γ˜∗2 such that σ
∗
N,Y = σ
∗, we proceed as follows. First, let P1 post a mechanism
γ∗1 in which δ
∗
(t,Y ),Y is such that
9
2
+ 8δ∗(t,Y ),Y = 8 + 4σ




In addition, let δ∗(t,Y ),N = 0, δ
∗
(m,Y ),Y = 0, δ
∗
(m,Y ),N = 1, and δ
∗
N,Y = 1. Second, let P2





and σ∗N,Y = σ
∗. One can check that the subgame
(γ∗1 , γ˜
∗
2) has an equilibrium in which A1 and A2 play ((t, Y )N,NY ). This yields P2 a payoff
10(1− σ∗).
Suppose next that P2 deviates to some direct mechanism γ˜2. The agents play the game
in Table 5.
Y N NY
(t, Y )N (10− 5
16
(7 + 8σ∗), 8 + 4σ∗) (10, 8 + 4σN,Y )
(m,Y )N (10, 9
2
) (5, 8 + 4σN,Y )
NY (9− σY,N , 12) (4 + 36σY,Y , 13− 6σY,Y )
Table 5: The subgame (γ∗1 , γ˜2) of G
M .
The analysis of such subgames consists of three steps.
Step 1 Consider first the subgames (γ∗1 , γ˜2) for σY,Y ≤ 16 and σN,Y ≥ σ∗. Our candidate
for an SPNE-PSP of GM has A1 and A2 playing ((t, Y )N,NY ) in any such subgame, which is
indeed a Nash equilibrium if σY,Y ≤ 16 and σN,Y ≥ σ∗, because NY is then weakly dominant
for A2 and (t, Y )N is then a best response of A1 to A2 playing NY . The corresponding
payoff for P2 is 10(1− σN,Y ), which is strictly decreasing in σN,Y . By construction, P2 does
not want to deviate to a mechanism γ˜2 such that σY,Y ≤ 16 and σN,Y > σ∗, which would
make her strictly worse off, or to a mechanism γ˜2 such that σY,Y <
1
6
and σN,Y = σ
∗, which
would leave her indifferent.




To see why, observe first that, if σY,Y >
1
6
, then (t, Y )N is strictly dominated in (γ∗1 , γ˜2) for
A1 and (γ∗1 , γ˜2) has no pure strategy Nash equilibrium. It is easy to check that (γ
∗
1 , γ˜2) has a
unique mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium in which A1 plays (m,Y )N with probability p and
NY with probability 1− p, where
p ≡ 6σY,Y − 1





and A2 plays Y N with probability q and NY with probability 1− q, where
q ≡ 36σY,Y − 1
36σY,Y + σY,N
.
Then P2’s payoff is
pqζ + p(1− q)10(1− σN,Y ) + (1− p)q(8 + 2σY,N) + (1− p)(1− q)ζ,
which is negative when the loss ζ is large enough as p is bounded away from 1 and q is




Step 3 We finally show that P2 does not want to deviate to a mechanism γ˜2 such that
σY,Y ≤ 16 and σN,Y < σ∗. Consider first the subgames such that σY,Y = 16 and σN,Y < σ∗. Our
candidate for an SPNE-PSP of GM has A1 and A2 playing (NY,NY ) in any such subgame,
which is indeed a Nash equilibrium. The corresponding payoff for P2 is ζ, so that she has no




and σN,Y < σ
∗. Observe that none of the resulting subgames (γ∗1 , γ˜2) has a Nash
equilibrium in which A2 plays a pure strategy. Thus, A1 must play (t, Y )N with positive
probability, for, otherwise, the unique best response of A2 would be NY . Moreover, A1 must
play (m,Y )N or NY with positive probability, for, otherwise, the unique best response of
A2 would be Y N . We distinguish three cases.
Case 1 Suppose first that A1 randomizes over (t, Y )N and (m,Y )N . For A2 to be
indifferent between Y N and NY , it must be that A1 plays (t, Y )N with probability p′ and









Similarly, for A1 to be indifferent between (t, Y )N and (m,Y )N , it must be that A2 plays






These strategies form a Nash equilibrium if A1 is not tempted to deviate to NY , which is
the case if and only if q′ ≥ q, with q as defined in Step 2. Then P2’s payoff is
q′ζ + p′(1− q′)10(1− σN,Y ) + (1− p′)(1− q′)ζ,
which is negative when the loss ζ is large enough as q′ is bounded away from 0 no matter
the value of σ∗.
12
Case 2 Suppose next that A2 randomizes over (t, Y )N and NY . For A2 to be indifferent
between Y N and NY , it must be that A1 plays (t, Y )N with probability p′′ and NY with
probability 1− p′′, where
p′′ ≡ 1− 6σY,Y
1− 6σY,Y + 4(σ∗ − σN,Y ) .
Similarly, for A1 to be indifferent between (t, Y )N and NY , it must be that A2 plays Y N
with probability q′′ and NY with probability 1− q′′, where
q′′ ≡ 6(1− 6σY,Y )
6(1− 6σY,Y ) + 116(19 + 40σ∗)− σY,N
.
These strategies form a Nash equilibrium if A1 is not tempted to deviate to (m,N)Y , which
is the case if and only if q ≥ q′, with q as defined in Step 2. Then P2’s payoff is
p′′q′′ζ + p′′(1− q′′)10(1− σN,Y ) + (1− p′′)q′′(8 + 2σY,N) + (1− p′′)(1− q′′)ζ,
and we must show that, when the loss ζ is large enough, this does not exceed the candidate
equilibrium payoff 10(1 − σ∗) uniformly in σY,Y < 16 , σN,Y < σ∗, and σY,N , given the above
expressions for p′′ and q′′. For conciseness, let us write
ε ≡ 1− 6σY,Y ,
η ≡ σ∗ − σN,Y ,
ξ ≡ 1
16
(19 + 40σ∗)− σY,N ,
and notice that ξ, unlike ε and η, is bounded away from 0. An upper bound for P2’s payoff
from deviating is
B ≡ [p′′q′′ + (1− p′′)(1− q′′)]ζ + p′′(1− q′′)10(1− σN,Y ) + 10(1− p′′)q′′,
and, with the above notation, we have
B − 10(1− σ∗) ≤ [p′′q′′ + (1− p′′)(1− q′′)]ζ + p′′(1− q′′)10(σ∗ − σN,Y ) + 10(1− p′′)q′′
∝ (6ε2 + 4ηξ)ζ + εξη + 240ηε
< η(4ξζ + εξ + 240ε),
which, as ξ is bounded away from 0 and ε ∈ [0, 1], is negative when the loss ζ is large enough,
uniformly in η and ε.
Case 3 Finally, if q = q′ = q′′, A1 is ready to randomize over (t, Y )N , (m,Y )N , and NY .
Instead of considering a completely mixed Nash equilibrium of (γ∗1 , γ˜2), we can however select
either of the equilibria constructed in Cases 1 and 2, which ensures that P2 has no incentive
to deviate. Hence the result. 
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3.3 Discussion: Min-Max versus Max-Min
Our example suggests that, in settings in which agents can take real participation decisions,
instead of mere reporting decisions, the min-max-min payoff (1) is not relevant for describing
principals’ equilibrium payoffs of competing-mechanism games with communication: indeed,
Proposition 2 shows that even minimal communication allows one to support equilibrium
payoffs for P2 below this value, which is equal to 10 in our example.
It is interesting, in that respect, to observe that the max-min-min payoff for P2,














Ez(γ1,γ˜2,λ)[v2(a, x)] ≤ 0. (3)
Thus, to show that V 2 ≤ 0, we only need to establish the following lemma.
Lemma 1 The two max-min-min payoffs in (2)–(3) coincide.
The upshot of this discussion is that the max-min-min and the min-max-min payoffs
(1)–(2) for P2 are ordered as follows:
V 2 ≤ 0 < 10 = V 2.
This wedge between the payoffs V 2 and V 2 reflects the fact that, in our two-principals
example, agents take strategic participation decisions. This contrasts with the min-max
theorem for one-shot complete-information games established by Ghosh and Han (2018,
Theorem 3) in line with the general discussions of Peters and Troncoso-Valverde (2013) and
Peters (2014).3 There are indeed two reasons why Sion’s (1958) min-max theorem does not
apply in the present context. The first is that the Nash correspondence Λ∗ : Γ˜1 × Γ˜2 
∆(A1)×∆(A2) in our example is not single-valued and is only upper hemicontinuous. This
implies that the mapping (γ˜1, γ˜2) 7→ minλ˜∈Λ∗(γ˜) Ez(γ˜,λ˜)[v2(a, x)] is not upper semicontinuous
in γ˜2;




3In two-principal settings, Theorem 3 in Ghosh and Han (2018) follows directly from Sion’s (1958) min-
max theorem.
4By contrast, it follows from the second half of Berge’s maximum theorem that this mapping is lower
semicontinuous in γ˜1 (Aliprantis and Border (2006, Lemma 17.30)).
5Indeed, if σY,Y =
1
6 , (NY,NY ) is a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in the game played by the agents
that yields P2 a payoff of ζ. By contrast, if σY,Y <
1
6 and, for instance, δY,Y = 1 and δY,N = δN,Y = 0, then
the game between the agents admits only a completely mixed Nash equilibrium in which the probability p′′′
with which A1 plays Y N is bounded away from 0, and the probability q′′′ with which A2 plays Y N tends
to 0 as σY,Y tends to
1
6 . The limit payoff for P2 is then (1− p′′′)ζ + p′′′10(1− σN,Y ) > ζ.
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The second is that, whereas the expectation Ez(γ˜,λ˜)[v2(a, x)] is linear in (γ˜, λ˜), there is no
reason for its minimum with respect to λ˜ ∈ Λ∗(γ˜) to be quasiconvex in γ˜1 and quasiconcave in
γ˜2. Thus letting the agents take real participation decisions naturally leads to discontinuities
and nonconvexities that prevent the usual min-max logic from applying, even if we allow
principals to randomize over their actions. Given the importance of participation decisions
in the applied literature on competing mechanisms, this casts serious doubt on the general
relevance of this logic.
Admittedly, Proposition 2 does not provide a full characterization of equilibrium payoffs
for principals; specifically, we have not checked whether V 2 < 0 and whether equilibria with
payoff for P2 down to that level can be sustained. Our second example will show that there is
no hope for obtaining a general result along these lines: neither the min-max-max payoff (1)
nor the max-min-min payoff (2) are relevant bounds for the characterization of equilibrium
payoffs of competing-mechanism games with communication.
4 The Second Example
Let J ≡ 2 and I ≡ 3, and let X1 ≡ {x11, x12, x13} and X2 ≡ {x21, x22, x23} be the sets
of actions of principal 1 (P1) and principal 2 (P2), respectively. Let A1 = A2 = A3 ≡
{Y N,NY,NN} be agent 1’s (A1), agent 2’s (A2), and agent 3’s (A3) sets of actions, with
the same interpretation as in the first example. To make the example as simple as possible,
we assume that the principals’ payoffs are not affected by agents’ participation decisions.
These payoffs are represented in the matrix below. Each array represents the payoffs to P1
and P2, respectively.
x21 x22 x23
x11 (1, 1) (−1, 2) (0, 0)
x12 (1,−1) (−1, 0) (0, 0)
x13 (0, 0) (0, 0) (0, 0)
Table 6: The payoff matrix for principals.
The agents’ payoffs are as follows. Each agent’s payoff is independent of the other agents’
participation decisions. Moreover, A1 strictly prefers to participate with P1, while A2 and
A3 strictly prefer to participate with P2. With these assumptions in mind, we conventionally
suppress the agents’ participation decisions in the expressions of their payoffs. In addition,
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A1 payoffs are such that
u1(x11, x22) = 2 > −2 = u1(x12, x22) = u1(x13, x22), (4)
so that, if P2 chooses x22, A1 would strictly prefer P1 to choose x11 rather than x12 or x13.
Unlike in our first example, we assume from the outset that the agents can communicate with
the principals through rich message spaces. The following lemma is an easy consequence of
the fact that agents’ actions have no impact on principals’s payoffs.





















Ez(γ,λ)[vj(a, x)] = 0. (5)
Proof. Because principals’ payoffs do not depend on agents’ participation decisions, we
can disregard the minλ∈Λ∗(γ) operator in the min-max-min and max-min-min payoffs in (5).
To show that they are equal to 0, observe that, for any mechanism γ−j ∈ ΓM−j−j , Pj can
defend a 0 payoff by committing to choose xj3 with probability 1, regardless of the agents’
participation and communication decisions. Likewise, P−j can bring down Pj’s payoff to 0
by committing to choose x−j3 with probability 1, regardless of the agents’ participation and
communication decisions. The result follows. 
An alternative, if less direct, proof of this result consists to notice that, because the sets
of direct mechanisms Γ˜1 and Γ˜2 are compact and convex subsets of a Euclidean space and the















and then to apply Ghosh and Han (2018, Lemma 1). This expresses the fact that, if the
payoffs (1)–(2)—which are specified only in terms of the primitives of the model—coincide,
no harsher punishment can be forced upon any principal by letting the other principal post
an indirect mechanism.
In contrast with our first example, this seems an a priori more promising scenario for the
min-max logic to apply. Indeed, a mechanical application of Yamashita’s (2010) and Peters
and Troncoso-Valverde’s (2013) results would suggest that any incentive-feasible allocation
yielding each principal a payoff above 0 can be supported in an SPNE-PSP of a game GM
with sufficiently rich message spaces; for instance, the message spaces may be large enough
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as to incorporate all direct mechanisms as in Yamashita (2010), allowing principals to use
recommendation mechanisms. Yet this approach is mislead, as we shall now see.
To first illustrate this point in an intuitive manner, notice that the only way P1 and
P2 can reach payoffs (1, 1) is by deterministically choosing the actions (x11, x21). Suppose
then, by way of contradiction, that there exists an SPNE-PSP (γ∗, λ∗) of some game GM
in which P1 and P2 choose these actions, and only these actions, on the equilibrium path.
For this to be the case, there must exist a message m11 ∈ M11 such that P1 chooses x11
following the consistent profile (m11, ∅, ∅, Y,N,N)—recall that, by assumption, A1 strictly
prefers to participate with P1, while A2 and A3 strictly prefer to participate with P2. But
P2 could then deviate to a mechanism γ2 committing her to choose x22 regardless of the
agents’ communication and participation decisions. Because of (4), A1 would then strictly
prefer that P1 chooses x11. In the subgame (γ
∗
1 , γ2), he can ensure this by participating with
P1 and sending her the message m11. This yields P2 a payoff of 2 > 1, and hence γ2 is a
profitable deviation for P2. Thus there is no SPNE-PNP of GM supporting the payoffs (1, 1)
for P1 and P2. The following result generalizes this insight to all payoffs above (0, 0) for P1
and P2, even if we allow them to play mixed strategies in equilibrium.
Proposition 3 The principals obtain payoffs (0, 0) in any SPNE of any game GM .
It should be noted that Proposition 3 does not depend on the size of the message spaces.
In particular, it holds true if these are large enough to incorporate the infinite-dimensional
space of direct mechanisms, allowing principals to use recommendation mechanisms. This
finding contrasts with the folk theorems of Yamashita (2010) and Peters and Troncoso-
Valverde (2013) in which every agent participates and communicates with all the principals.
5 Concluding Remarks
The upshot of the two examples discussed in this paper is threefold.
Antifolk Theorems The examples lead us to question the logic of the folk theorems for
competing-mechanism games. Our first example illustrates a situation in which principals’
payoffs below the min-max-min bounds identified by Peters and Troncoso-Valverde (2013),
Peters (2014), and Ghosh and Han (2018) can be supported in equilibrium. Our second
example illustrates a situation in which no payoff for the principals above the min-max-min
bound identified by Yamashita (2010) can be supported in equilibrium even if agents can
choose messages from arbitrarily rich message spaces. The examples highlights the two key
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reasons why the folk-theorem logic fails to hold. In the first example, agents’ participation
decisions are payoff-relevant. In the second example, an agent can communicate with a
principal only if he chooses to participate with her. Both features are prominent in economic
applications of competing-mechanism games.6
Exclusive Competition and Direct Mechanisms In line with competing-auctions and
competitive-search models in the applied literature, our examples postulate that competition
is exclusive: each agent can participate and communicate with at most one principal. Yet,
a main feature of these applications is the restriction to direct mechanisms. That is, each
seller only requires the buyers who participate with her to submit their exogenous private
information. Under complete information, this amounts to each seller posting take-it-or-leave-
it offers for the buyers participating with her. The difficulties in establishing a general folk
theorem that we highlight may lead one to ask whether, under exclusive competition, direct
mechanisms achieve a full characterization of equilibrium. Our first example provides a clear
negative answer. Indeed, an immediate implication of Propositions 1–2 is the existence of
many equilibrium outcomes that cannot be supported by direct mechanisms. In this respect,
we document a failure of the revelation principle in competing-mechanism games of exclusive
competition: direct mechanisms are not flexible enough to reproduce all the threats that P1
can implement using the payoff-irrelevant message m.7 This failure is dramatic: while the
game G˜ has a unique equilibrium payoff vector, a continuum of Pareto-ranked equilibria can
be sustained in the game GM as soon as a single agent has the opportunity to send a single
additional message to a single principal.
To interpret this failure of the revelation principle under exclusive competition, it is
helpful to contrast our example with related results in the literature. First, the example
is cast in a complete-information framework; this contrasts with Martimort (1996), Peck
(1997), and Attar, Campioni, and Piaser (2018), who crucially exploit the agents’ private
information. Second, the example does not rely on direct externalities between the principals,
but instead exploits the strategic role of the agents’ joint participation and communication
decisions; hence it does not rely on the intuitions developed by Martimort (1996) in the
6Clearly, our results do not contradict the possibility of multiple equilibrium allocations arising in a
specific class of applications. In this respect, Han (2016) shows how indirect mechanisms can be used to
sustain multiple symmetric equilibria in a simple competitive-search setting.
7Thus Propositions 1–2 extend to exclusive-competition environments the insights developed by Peters
(2001) and Martimort and Stole (2002) in single-agent, nonexclusive-competition environments. The example
suggests that, to implement all relevant threats, there is no need for each agent to communicate with all
principals; this ex-post vindicates our assumption that communication is tied to participation, in the sense
that an agent who chooses not to participate with a principal does not get to meaningfully communicate
with her.
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context of competing hierarchies. Third, principals in the example play pure strategies in
equilibrium; hence we do not rely on the limited power of direct mechanisms to extract
the agents’ information on the realization of principals’ mixed strategies, in contrast with
Peck (1997). In a sense, thus, we have put ourselves in the worst possible scenario for
communication to play a role: agents have no private information of their own and each
principal’s equilibrium mechanism is deterministic so that there is no need to use the agents
to reveal it to the other principal. Despite these drastic features, our example documents the
potentially destabilizing role of communication even in complete-information environments.
This questions the prevalent use of direct mechanisms in the applied literature.
Equilibrium Characterization: New Ideas Taken together, our examples emphasize
that disregarding agents’ participation decisions in competing-mechanism games entails a
severe loss of generality. Observe, in this respect, that our results do not depend on
the specific assumption of exclusive competition. In particular, the second example can
be reformulated in a nonexclusive scenario where each agent can participate with more
than one principal at a time, provided that communication is tied to participation. The
explicit consideration of agents’ participation decisions introduces a fundamental constraint
on principals’ design of mechanisms. When designing a mechanism, a principal anticipates
that her payoff will be affected by agents’ participation decisions, which in turn depend on
the entire profile of posted mechanisms. Dealing with this additional moral-hazard dimension
may require a more sophisticated class of mechanisms, in which a principal can send private
signals to agents. In recent work, Attar, Campioni and Piaser (2019) provide an example
of a complete-information competing-mechanism game in which principals use such private
communication to correlate their decisions with those of the agents in equilibrium. The
resulting set of equilibrium allocations and the set of equilibrium allocations that can be
supported with standard recommendation mechanisms turn out to be disjoint. All these
insights point towards the need to develop new ideas and devices to approach equilibrium
characterization in competing-mechanism games.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. This is in fact an instance of a general result in the spirit of Myerson’s
(1982) revelation principle. The intuition is that, for any direct mechanism γ˜2 of P2 and any
mechanism γ1 of P1, and for any Nash equilibrium λ of the subgame (γ1, γ˜2) of G
M , there
exist a direct mechanism γ˜1 of P1 and a Nash equilibrium λ˜ of the subgame γ˜ ≡ (γ˜1, γ˜2)
of G˜ such that the two resulting allocations coincide, z(γ˜, λ˜) = z(γ1, γ˜2, λ). Indeed, P1 can
reproduce the randomizations over messages performed by A1 in λ1(γ1, γ˜2) in case he decides




λ1(γ1, γ˜2)((t, Y )N)γ1((t, Y ), a
2
1) + λ
1(γ1, γ˜2)((m,Y )N)γ1((m,Y ), a
2
1)
λ1(γ1, γ˜2)((t, Y )N) + λ1(γ1, γ˜2)((m,Y )N)
for all a21 ∈ A21. That is, if A1 chooses to participate with P1, then P1 first draws a






, respectively, and then, depending on the outcome of this
lottery, chooses x11 with probability γ1((t, Y ), a
2
1) or γ1((m,Y ), a
2
1). If A1 chooses not to
participate with P1, then we set
γ˜1(N, a
2
1) ≡ γ1((∅, N), a21)
for all a21 ∈ A21. Turning to the agent’s strategies, we define
λ˜1(γ˜1, γ˜2)(Y N) ≡ λ1(γ1, γ˜2)((t, Y )N) + λ1(γ1, γ˜2)((m,Y )N),
λ˜1(γ˜1, γ˜2)(NY ) ≡ λ1(γ1, γ˜2)((∅, N)Y ),
λ˜2(γ˜1, γ˜2)(Y N) ≡ λ2(γ1, γ˜2)(Y N).
By construction, z(γ˜, λ˜) = z(γ1, γ˜2, λ). Moreover, because P1 reproduces the randomizations
of A1 in case she decides to participate with her, the incentives of the agents are unchanged.
Hence λ˜ is a Nash equilibrium of the subgame γ˜, as required. 
Proof of Proposition 3. Suppose, by way of contradiction, that there exists an SPNE of
some game GM in which at least one of the principals obtains a positive payoff. The proof
consists of two steps.
Step 1 We first claim that, on the candidate SPNE equilibrium path, P1 chooses x11
with positive probability. Suppose, indeed, that P1 never chooses x11 in the SPNE under
consideration. Then P2 must obtain a 0 payoff, which she can guarantee by committing
to choose x23 with probability 1, regardless of the agents’ communication and participation
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decisions. By assumption, P1 must, therefore, obtain a positive payoff. If P1 never chooses
x11, this can occur if and only if P1 and P2 choose (x12, x21) with positive probability. But
P2 would then obtain a negative profit, a contradiction. The claim follows.
Step 2 We next claim that P2’s unique best response in the candidate SPNE consists
in committing to play x22 with probability 1, regardless of the agents’ communication and
participation decisions. We distinguish two types of subgames, depending on the mechanism
posted by P1 according to her—possibly mixed—equilibrium strategy µ∗1 ∈ ∆(ΓM11 ).
Case 1 Consider first the mechanisms γ1 in the support of µ
∗
1 such that there is no message
m11 ∈M11 such that P1 chooses x11 with positive probability following the consistent profile
(m11, ∅, ∅, Y,N,N); call C1 the corresponding set of mechanisms. Committing herself to
choose x22 with probability 1, regardless of the agents’ communication and participation
decisions, ensures P2 to obtain her maximal payoff of 0 in any subgame in which P1 posts
a mechanism in C1.
Case 2 Consider next the mechanisms γ1 in the support of µ
∗
1 such that there is a message
m11 ∈M11 such that P1 chooses x11 with positive probability following the consistent profile
(m11, ∅, ∅, Y,N,N); that is, γ1 ∈ suppµ∗1 \ C1. It follows from (4) that A1 will, among
these messages, choose one that maximizes the probability γ1(m
1
1, ∅, ∅, Y,N,N)(x11) of P1
choosing x11. Committing herself to choose x22 with probability 1, regardless of the agents’
communication and participation decisions, ensures P2 to obtain her maximal payoff of
2 maxm11∈M11 {γ1(m11, ∅, ∅, Y,N,N)(x11)} in any subgame in which P1 posts a mechanism in
suppµ∗1 \ C1.
According to Step 1, µ∗1(suppµ
∗
1 \C1) > 0, so that Case 2 arises with positive probability.
The claim follows.
Step 3 According to Steps 1 and 2, in the candidate SPNE, P1 chooses x11 with positive
probability while P2 chooses x22 with probability 1. Hence P1 must earn a negative payoff.
This, however, is a contradiction, as she can guarantee herself a 0 payoff by committing to
choose x13 with probability 1. Hence the result. 
21
References
[1] Aliprantis, C.D., and K.C. Border (2006): Infinite Dimensional Analysis: A Hitchhiker’s
Guide, Berlin, Heidelberg, New York: Springer.
[2] Attar, A., E. Campioni, and G. Piaser (2018): “On Competing Mechanisms under
Exclusive Competition,” Games and Economic Behavior, 111, 1–15.
[3] Attar, A., E. Campioni, and G. Piaser (2019): “Private Communication in Competing
Mechanism Games,” Unpublished Manuscript, Toulouse School of Economics.
[4] Aumann, R.J. (1961): “Borel Structures for Function Spaces,” Illinois Journal of Math-
ematics, 5(4), 614–630.
[5] Auster, S., and P. Gottardi (2019): “Competing Mechanisms in Markets for Lemons,”
Theoretical Economics, forthcoming.
[6] Eeckhout, J., and P. Kircher (2010): “Sorting vs Screening: Search Frictions and
Competing Mechanisms,” Journal of Economic Theory, 145(4), 1354–1385.
[7] Epstein, L.G., and M. Peters (1999): “A Revelation Principle for Competing
Mechanisms,” Journal of Economic Theory, 88(1), 119–160.
[8] Ghosh, S., and S. Han (2018): “Competing Mechanisms: One-Shot versus Repeated
Games,” Unpublished Manuscript, McMaster University.
[9] Han, S. (2007): “Strongly Robust Equilibrium and Competing-Mechanism Games,”
Journal of Economic Theory, 137(1), 610–626.
[10] Han, S. (2016): “Sellers’ Implicit Collusion in Directed Search Markets,” The B.E.
Journal of Theoretical Economics, 16(2), 711–738.
[11] Kalai A., E. Kalai , E. Lehrer, and D. Samet (2010): “A Commitment Folk Theorem,”
Games and Economic Behavior, 69(1), 127–137.
[12] Martimort, D. (1996): “Exclusive Dealing, Common Agency, and Multiprincipal
Incentives Theory,” RAND Journal of Economics, 27(1), 1–31.
[13] Martimort, D., and L. Stole (2002): “The Revelation and Delegation Principles in
Common Agency Games,” Econometrica, 70(4), 1659–1673.
22
[14] McAfee, R. (1993): “Mechanism Design by Competing Sellers,” Econometrica, 61(6),
1281–1312.
[15] Moen, E.R. (1997): “Competitive Search Equilibrium,” Journal of Political Economy,
105(2), 385–411.
[16] Myerson, R.B. (1979): “Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem,” Econo-
metrica, 47(1), 61–73.
[17] Myerson, R.B. (1982): “Optimal Coordination Mechanisms in Generalized
Principal-Agent Problems,” Journal of Mathematical Economics, 10(1), 67–81.
[18] Peck, J. (1997): “A Note on Competing Mechanisms and the Revelation Principle,”
Unpublished Manuscript, Ohio State University.
[19] Peters, M. (1997): “A Competitive Distribution of Auctions,” Review of Economic
Studies, 64(1), 97–123.
[20] Peters, M. (2001): “Common Agency and the Revelation Principle,” Econometrica,
69(5), 1349–1372.
[21] Peters, M. (2014): “Competing Mechanisms,” Canadian Journal of Economics, 47(2),
373–397.
[22] Peters, M. (2015): “Reciprocal Contracting,” Journal of Economic Theory, 158(PA),
102–126.
[23] Peters, M., and S. Severinov (1997): “Competition among Sellers Who Offer Auctions
Instead of Prices,” Journal of Economic Theory, 75(1), 141–179.
[24] Peters M., and B. Szentes (2012): “Definable and Contractible Contracts,” Economet-
rica, 80(1), 363–411.
[25] Peters, M., and C. Troncoso-Valverde (2013): “A Folk Theorem for Competing
Mechanisms,” Journal of Economic Theory, 148(3), 953–973.
[26] Rao, B.V. (1971): “Borel Structures for Function Spaces,” Colloquium Mathematicum,
23(1), 33–38.
[27] Sion, M. (1958): “On General Minimax Theorems,” Pacific Journal of Mathematics,
8(1), 171–176.
23
[28] Szentes, B. (2009): “A Note on ‘Mechanism Games with Multiple Principals and Three
or More Agents’ by T. Yamashita,” Unpublished Manuscript, University College London.
[29] Szentes, B. (2015): “Contractible Contracts in Common Agency Problems,” Review of
Economic Studies, 82(1), 391–422.
[30] Tennenholz, M. (2004): “Program Equilibrium,” Games and Economic Behavior, 49(2),
363–373.
[31] Virag, G. (2010): “Competing Auctions: Finite Markets and Convergence,” Theoretical
Economics, 5(2), 241–274.
[32] Wright, R., P. Kircher, B. Julien, and V. Guerrieri (2017): “Directed Search and
Competitive Search: A Guided Tour,” NBER Working Paper No. 23884.
[33] Xiong, S. (2013): “A Folk Theorem for Contract Games with Multiple Principals and
Agents,” Unpublished Manuscript, Rice University.
[34] Yamashita, T. (2010): “Mechanism Games With Multiple Principals and Three or More
Agents,” Econometrica, 78(2), 791–801.
24
